German and, by extension, European politics is about to become out of kilter. Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a party repeatedly labeled by the German security services as a threat to constitutional democracy and with an explicitly ethnic-nationalist platform of remigration and rejection of post-war German guilt, AfD has come a strong second in national elections.
Destined to hold the feet of the centre-right CDU to the fire as the Christian Democrats no doubt enter a coalition with the left, the rise of the AfD particularly with its overt identitarian messaging tailored to the German youth has shattered most of the preconceived conceptions about the radical right in the very state where such an occurrence was never meant to occur.
One stint in opposition and another four of five of dysfunctional progressive rule it is not inconceivable that the AfD could headline the next German coalition government, particularly as the transatlantic relationship shifts and a resolution to the Ukraine war further discredits Berlin’s elites.
All very impressive for a party scarcely a decade old even if such an ascent occurred in the context of spiraling demographic rates.
Now let’s compare it to Ireland.
Recent European, local, and national elections showed an audience of about 2% to 3% for overtly radical right parties. Healthy numbers in another era but hopelessly divided microfactions each plagued with individual problems largely stemming from ineffective leadership and the increasingly salient problem of newly radicalised yet politically ineffective political boomers.
Beyond that divided field, there are two mainstream enough ‘populist’ parties Aontú and Independent Ireland respectively at approximately 3% each. Certainly more grounded than the smaller nationalist parties and with an ideologically solid grassroots membership both parties in turn suffer from their own leadership and organisational problems.
In the case of Aontú, the problem rests solely on the eminently competent but ideologically unreliable figure of Tóibín and his explicit alignment with the hard left on replacement migration. For Independent Ireland, the problem is in many respects but more comedic with the farcical actions of newly minted MEP Mullooly to align with the liberal-left in the European Parliament rightly discrediting the party in the eyes of even centre-right parties.
Again, like Aontú, Independent Ireland, despite a largely solid activist cadre, suffers from a clear metapolitical vision beyond maybe just maybe influencing the next Programme for Government. II is doomed never to break out of the justified perception that the party is just a ruse by its decentralised gombeen leadership for greater state funding.
Beyond the microparties and established parliamentary groupings are various independents (Nolan, Keogan, Delahanty, Steenson) who despite lacking a national party machine have been some of the top performers in the past decade or so, avoiding some of the traps of larger parties have wandered into. However, an odd councilor here or there or a solid Oireachtas member will never compensate for a proper nationwide party organisation, clear vision, and an ability to tap into wider discontent.
What the Germans Did Right
Earning the adage the Professorenpartei (Professors Party) the AfD grew up around a nexus of Euro-critical academics, journalists, and security figures disgruntled with the handling of the euro crisis by Angela Merkel.
These academics included Bernd Lucke, who served as the party’s primary spokesman until being ousted by the identitarian faction in 2015. The political environment of the AfD upon its birth was radically different than the halcyon days of 2025, just before Merkel opened the nation’s doors to Syrians, Afghans, and whoever else was able to cross the German frontiers from 2015 onwards.
Prior to the AfD, the German populist right had had a rather frustrating existence. The crypto-fascist NPD had limped on for decades largely out of the rather ironic fact the state couldn’t ban the party due to the number of federal informants in its ranks, with crank Neo-Nazi groups and tough hate speech laws providing tough hurdles for nationalists to overcome.
The AfD was different, providing a conduit for patriotic CDU members to exit the Merkel-era centre right and transition to a safe political vehicle. This dovetailed with smart entryism by ideological nationalists largely in former Eastern Germany who created a distinctly identitarian brand of politics as they locked down party branches before they could be purged.
This polarity between Eastern radicals and West German moderates was a surprisingly productive synthesis as the party prospered amid a worsening migration crisis. Authorities as much as they tried were simply unable to dislodge radical nationalists such as Björn Höcke due to the centre right wing of the AfD which made it impossible to typecast the party as extreme.
Similarly, Western reformers were unable to dislodge Björn Höcke’s Thuringia-based Der Flügel wing as it became a rallying point for 2010s identitarians channeled directly into the belly of the party.
The Ukraine war was another focal point providing not only a reckoning with Germany’s overreliance on the liberal United States but a radicalising moment for all of German society from Eurasian-focused industrialists who had pegged their futures on economic ties with Russia and China or the average citizen who had to grapple with rising energy prices.
In the context of a worsening migration crisis thanks to the fall of Kabul’s puppet government which flooded Germany with the much more violent breed of migration, single Afghan males and a loveless coalition of the hard left, centre and social democrats the AfD catapulted into second place.
The conscious shift in favour of radicalism (Ausländer Raus, the usage of remigration, and overt stance against Ukraine) was a bet the party made that has paid off. Similarly, despite a regionalised and decentralised leadership, the true beating heart of the AfD is not Alice Weidel but eastern radicals like Höcke and Maximillian Krah who have rightly capitalised off youth energy and savvy TikTok campaigns.
You simply cannot ban a nationalist party with 20% national support, likely closer to 40% among the military and police that knows how to play and win the optics game. It awaits to be seen if the AfD can navigate a still-divided leadership and avoid the temptation of a compromise coalition with the CDU the party will benefit from its commitment to youth-orientated radicalism.
What Ireland Did Wrong and How the Irish Right Can Still Redeem Itself
2018, specifically the loss of the 8th amendment was a year-zero movement for the Irish Right and Ireland in general. The scaffolding behind even residual deference to Catholic constitutional norms came down as the combination of a hyper-progressive FF/FG and SF as well as a peak NGO complex did victory laps around the charred remains of the pro-life movement.
The pro-life movement had held the line for decades but gave way under pressure from a full-frontal attack by the state and progressives consciously to stamp out even trace elements of right-wing populism following the shock wins of Trump and Brexit two years prior.
Much of the pro-life movement evolved into Gript, a competent media venture that has tapped into the resurgence of conservative-minded anti-establishment politics, allowing them to score numerous blows during the time of COVID and subsequently.
Politically, the Irish Right has made solid strides in recent years, a welcome development, but hampered by certain factors and figures:
A questionable figure in the 2000s when he crippled the No to Nice campaign with his dalliances with European neo-fascism (incidentally disavowed at the time) Justin Barrett returned to right-wing politics in 2016. A Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde character at the best of times Barrett led his party into near-oblivion by his gradual embrace of Neo-Nazism regardless of an original commitment to mimic European nationalist parties.
This failure was mirrored by Gemma O’Doherty, a one-time viable figure for the Irish Presidency and who certainly would have entered the European Parliament on her journalistic prestige alone who promptly dispensed with any credibility she had through endorsing hare-brained American-imported conspiracy theories, a feat replicated by Dolores Cahill and John Waters. Parallel to this was the flatlining of the IFP under the tutelage of Hermann Kelly fundamentally unable to rise to the challenge of becoming an Irish UKIP as originally envisioned.
All these deficiencies entered centre stage during the pandemic years when a divided, conspiracy-prone, and politically immature Irish Right failed to leave the gates despite a clear mainstream audience.
The emergence of the East Wall protest movements was a mild respite. An injection of proletariat energy revitalised and transformed an otherwise lacking right-wing scene. New figures entered the fray, and even the semi-mainstreaming of nationalist talking points in a lively, albeit imperfect, street movement swayed even right-leaning members of the Oireachtas.
The zenith of this vibe shift came with the European and local elections which showed promising results, namely solid aggregate results for nationalists running for MEPs as well as the landmark moment of populist councillors taking seats.
This energy quickly ran into a wall come the time of November’s general elections. General election campaigning takes resources and expertise that the Right is still constructing. A winter election at the end of a long year of local elections and a referendum were taxing, and there is a learning curve still being scaled. Divisions among right-wing microparties and a more proactive government dog whistling campaign to diffuse discontent also factored into no nationalist TDs elected, as even Independent Ireland and Aontú underperformed relative to even their moderate potential.
The failure to stamp out conspiracy-prone boomerisms, the inability to purge toxic figures from the 2010s as well as a general lack of professionalism leaves the Irish Right at the time of writing in a rather frustrating place not helped by an obvious generational disparity.
Failure by many not to even grasp the basic realities of Irish politics, not associating with Belfast loyalists or broadcasting extremist views on personal social media accounts, also goes some of the way to channeling the Right into an effective cul-de-sac. Despite a groundswell of discontent, the growing normalisation of migration-critical views, and many promising political openings there simply is no definitive vehicle on the political board right-now for the populist or nationalist right.
Ironically, a history of labouring under extreme hate speech laws has forced a professionalisation of the Germans incomparable to Ireland. In Germany boomers unable to hold their tongue are sent to jail or face severe legal consequences, in Ireland, their equivalents clog up genuine political progress.
Despite some causes for concern, there are many positive aspects about Ireland, the Irish population, and where a budding nationalist movement can go based on Germany’s recent experience.
Schizo Sanitaire: The greatest impediment to the Irish Right is the Irish Right itself. A respectable chunk of the Irish electorate is chomping at the bit for a viable right alternative. However, half a decade of death by association with Gemma O’Doherty and assorted characters has dented public perception of anything to the right of Michael McDowell. There is no political future for those who obsess about the Kalergi Plan, WEF, or sovereign harps in Irish politics. If the AfD drew the line at disassociating itself from informant-ridden Neo-Nazis and Reichsbürgers then Ireland must do so with mindless conspiracy cranks more interested in venting their spleens with their conspiracies than constructive politics. Not to mention the usually younger hyper-online malcontents who seem intent on showing discord and not much else.
The Absent Security State: If the AfD and its membership successfully dealt with BND and frequent attempts to ban them, then their prospective Irish equivalents have less to worry about, this side of the border anyway. The Republic of Ireland lacks the constitutional, security, and legal means to clamp down on a nonviolent nationalist movement, and that situation is unlikely to change anytime soon. Ireland also lacks a proper institutionalised left able to purge the public and private sectors, as was seen in Germany.
An Irish Professor’s Party? The ultimate divergence between the AfD and its Irish offerings was their foundational basis, which consisted of right-leaning academics and disaffected CDU members mixed in with Eastern radicals. Such a melange is unlikely under current conditions, but it should emphasize that quality always trumps quantity in politics. Populists often need the expertise and insider knowledge of those with prior party experience rather than going it alone.
Young Ireland: The weaponisation of TikTok and edgy rhetoric has earned the AfD an enviable foothold among the under-30s almost unthinkable even five years ago. The AfD and other Europopulist parties are the beneficiaries of angry young man energy buttered up by irreverent humour and a masculine overturn of the progressive status quo. The ability to tap into young blood is a phenomenon so far escaping the Irish Right bar small pockets and a character such as Keith Woods. From an endemic housing crisis to the normalised nature of ethno-nationalism in Irish life Ireland could and should be primed for such a youth revolt given the right conditions.
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