After the Belfast Riots: How Will Northern Nationalism Respond to Replacement Migration

We, as the emerging Irish nationalist right in this country, must state in no uncertain terms our utter abhorrence towards loyalism and refuse any co-operation, formal or otherwise, with such a virulently anti-Irish ideology. 

There is no moral or political distinction to be made between Glenn Kane and Josef Puska. There is no untapped vote to be courted among the ranks of political loyalism. The great mass of loyalists will never give their vote or their transfer to any Irish nationalist party of any shade, no matter how much they may agree on immigration or how much they moderate their tone on the Six Counties.

There are some 800,000 Northern nationalists in the Six Counties—those are our people. Many of them were privately sympathetic to the aims of the protestors in Coolock and East Wall—some even went as far as to attend rallies in Dublin to show their solidarity. Some nationalist towns in the Six Counties have already been impacted by demographic change. 

There are of course differing dynamics to consider: a very strong tradition of left-wing republicanism and a bloc system of voting which dissuades vote splitting lest unionism benefits at nationalism’s expense. The recent events have also inextricably linked anti-immigration sentiment to violent and anti-Irish Ulster loyalism in the eyes of many nationalists, not helped by the fact that some loyalist protestors took it upon themselves to goad local nationalists in the Lower Ormeau Road about the 1992 Sean Graham bookies’ massacre. There is also the spectre of dissident republicanism—heavily infiltrated by British security forces—which makes activism, organising, and even expressing opinions in a social setting a personal security risk.

Dublin and Belfast are a tale of two cities when it comes to the fightback against mass immigration. In Dublin, we saw a highly committed, well-organised community-led movement come out peacefully and respectably in East Wall, focusing their grievances solely towards the Government. 

This model spread like a prairie fire across Dublin and then the remainder of the 26 counties. They built up networks and communication channels whereby they could convert local discontent towards meaningful political change. Within eighteen months, this hard work had paid off with the election of three councillors and nearly 8% of the vote in total across the entire city.

In Belfast, we saw the complete opposite. Instead of a measured and peaceful demonstration against mass immigration and the horrific killings in Southport, there was a confused race riot against Muslims. 

Dublin had Malachy Steenson as its spokesperson, Belfast had the South Belfast UDA. When interviewed, those of East Wall spoke candidly yet reasonably about their anxieties and fears regarding immigration, the changes to their community, the pressure on local amenities, the fear of walking down the street. In Belfast, we saw Stephen Nolan of the BBC interview a drunk outside a paramilitary bar in Sandy Row talking about his hatred of non-whites. In this illustrative example, we see once more proof of the complete inferiority of Ulster loyalism as a political force compared to Irish nationalism.

The 2021 Census showed that 6.5% of the North’s population was born outside either the 32 counties or Great Britain, a figure that rises to almost 10% in Belfast and a staggering 25% in the Botanic district of Belfast containing Sandy Row. Post-COVID, there has been a significant surge in immigration from non-EU countries like India, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and the Philippines. What effect will this have on the constitutional question, especially when many of these people–benefitting from their status as Commonwealth citizens–can presumably legally vote in a border poll? Some of whom may even be entitled to the right of abode and a fast-tracked path to British citizenship that they probably won’t have in an all-Ireland state?

Recent polling reported by the Belfast Telegraph showed a night and day difference: 82% of unionists agreed that immigration was too high, only 13% of nationalists concurred. Nearly nine-tenths of nationalists are either content with or ignorant of the scale of mass immigration. Although it may be fairly argued that the debacle in Belfast pushed many well-meaning nationalists away and that the context surrounding the current immigration debate may make nationalists hesitant to be seen as being sympathetic towards loyalist violence, nationalists in mid-Ulster are no less aware of the change occurring around them than loyalists are in Sandy Row. For many, it could only be a pure oppositional stance to what is perceived to be a loyalist issue and that to be anti-immigration is to be pro-British.

However we must resist the temptation to assume that Northern nationalism is a lost cause: the fact remains that the Irish Right has failed to develop a policy on immigration tailored to the interests of nationalists in Belfast and Derry. It is an existential threat to Irish nationalists’ unfettered right to self-determination in their own country and will deny them the majority in the Six Counties that a free united Ireland cannot be realised without. We do not argue that immigrant communities are unionists per se, but that the religious question in Ireland is a mere triviality to them. They will vote based on their own interests as ethnic minorities therefore they are an unpredictable variable that must be accounted for in any discussion about Irish unity. For some communities, that will entail voting to remain under British rule.

In the coming years, we face a British Labour Government intent on replicating the Irish Government in imposing asylum centres on communities that do not want them with the chilling warning that all local authorities in the United Kingdom–including the North–must take their “fair share.” And when Northern nationalism’s East Wall moment comes, the question of immigration will rise to the forefront across all of Ireland’s thirty-two counties. Our day will come.